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Scientifi c Challenges to Free Will 
 EDDY  NAHMIAS 
 Scientists have recently claimed that their discoveries challenge free will. For instance, 
psychologist Jonathan Bargh concludes that  “ The phenomenological feeling of  free will 
is very real [ … ] but this strong feeling is an illusion ” ( 2008 : 148 – 149). Neuroscientist 
John - Dylan Haynes claims that his functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
research shows that
 [t]here ’ s not very much space for operation of  free will. The outcome of  a decision is shaped 
very strongly by brain activity much earlier than the point in time when you feel to be 
making a decision.  (Youngsteadt  2008 ) 
 And neuroscientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen conclude:  “ The net effect of  
this infl ux of  scientifi c information will be a rejection of  free will as it is ordinarily con-
ceived with important ramifi cations for the law ” ( 2004 : 1776). Indeed, what scientists 
say about free will could have a signifi cant impact not only on our legal practices, but 
on our conception of  ourselves and of  others as morally responsible agents. This impact 
is likely to be exacerbated by the way in which the research is presented by the science 
media. For instance,  ScienceNews reports:  “  ‘ Free will ’ is not the defi ning feature of  
humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is rather an illusion that endures only 
because biochemical complexity conceals the mechanisms of  decision making ” 
(12/6/08). And Jeffrey Rosen asks:  “ And since all behavior is caused by our brains, 
wouldn ’ t this mean all behavior could potentially be excused? ” ( New York Times 
3/11/07). 
 It is therefore important to consider carefully what discoveries these scientists take 
to be challenging free will and whether these claims are justifi ed. In the present essay 
I take on this task, fi rst by distinguishing among various ways the research might pose 
challenges to free will, then by considering whether it actually does. 
 Philosophical debates about free will focus largely on one question: is free will 
compatible with  determinism ? So the most straightforward scientifi c challenge to free 




 [D1]  Free will requires that determinism is false. 
 [D2]  Science is showing that determinism is true. 
 [D3]  So, science is showing that we do not have free will. 
 For instance Bargh writes:  “ The psychological issue of  whether free will exists thus boils 
down to whether  undetermined choices of  action exist ” ( 2008 : 130), and he and Ferguson 
take their research to  “ present the case for the determinism of  higher mental processes ” 
( 2000 : 926). Lawrence Tancredi writes:  “ Free will, long considered a hallmark of  what 
makes us human, seems to be losing ground to claims of  biological determinism ” 
( 2007 : 305). 
 One problem with this argument is that the scientists simply  assume that premise 
[D1] is true, ignoring the substantial philosophical literature supporting  compatibi-
lism , the view that free will does  not require the falsity of  determinism (see McKenna 
 2004 ). Perhaps these scientists take incompatibilism to be commonsensical, but this 
assumption is controversial and may be based on confusing determinism with differ-
ent threats to free will (Nahmias et al.  2006, 2007b ). More importantly, science is 
 not showing determinism to be true.  Determinism , as understood in the incompatibil-
ists ’ arguments for [D1] (see for instance van Inwagen  1983 ), is the thesis that a 
complete description of  a system at one time, conjoined with a complete description 
of  the laws which govern that system, entails a complete description of  that system 
at any future time. In a deterministic system, given identical circumstances, the same 
causal antecedent will always have the exact same effects. But the dominant interpre-
tation in quantum physics suggests that determinism, so defi ned, is false. While some 
philosophers have looked to quantum indeterminism in the hope that it might allow 
for free will (Kane  1996 ), most conclude that such indeterminism would not provide 
us with any relevant type of  control which we could not have without it. This should 
make us wonder why philosophers focus so much attention on determinism and 
whether they are neglecting scientifi c discoveries seemingly more relevant to human 
free will  – namely discoveries about human psychology rather than discoveries in 
microphysics. 
 In fact the scientists who are claiming that free will is an illusion are not physicists. 
They are neuroscientists and psychologists. While, in practice, these scientists may 
aspire to offer deterministic explanations and laws for the systems they study, these 
sciences are not in a position to establish determinism. Most of  their discoveries involve 
statistical correlations that are compatible with indeterminism. Moreover, it is implau-
sible to think that indeterministic interactions at the microphysical level  never have an 
effect on the way things happen at, say, the neurobiological level. And  ‘ near - enough 
determinism ’ is simply not suffi cient to make incompatibilist arguments go through 
(i.e., to justify premise D2). 
 It turns out that these skeptical scientists are not really working with a philosophical 
conception of  determinism. Rather they tend to use  ‘ determinism ’ to mean something 
else, namely  mechanism . Mechanism is the view that mental phenomena can be fully 
explained in terms of  their component neurobiological parts and in terms of  the organi-
zation of, and interactions between, these parts (see Craver  2007 ). Consider how neu-
roscientist Benjamin Libet defi nes  ‘ determinism ’ in terms of  mechanism, explicitly 
setting aside quantum indeterminism:
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 But we have not answered the question of  whether our consciously willed acts are fully 
determined by natural laws that govern the activities of  nerve cells in the brain, or whether 
conscious decisions can proceed to some degree independently of  natural determinism [ … ] 
Quantum mechanics forces us to deal with probabilities rather than with certainties of  
events [ … ] [but] they might nevertheless be in accord with natural laws and therefore 
determined.  (Libet  1999 : 55) 
 Bargh and Ferguson make a similar move:
 We consider the discovery and delineation of  the causal mechanisms that underlie these 
[conscious] processes and the quest for supplying mechanisms [ … ] as the critical and defi n-
ing criteria of  the deterministic stance.  (Bargh and Ferguson  2000 : 926) 
 This sort of  mechanism could clearly be true even if  determinism is false (for example 
if  any of  the component parts in a mechanistic system interact in  indeterministic ways). 
Conversely, determinism could be true even in a non - mechanistic system (for example 
if  both physical laws and psychological laws are deterministic, but psychological proc-
esses cannot be fully explained in terms of  physical processes). Hence it is misleading 
to present determinism as a threat to free will by trading on threats posed by mecha-
nism or vice versa. 
 We need a different argument to represent the challenge to free will that psycholo-
gists and neuroscientists have in mind: 
 [M1]  Free will requires that mechanism is false. 
 [M2]  Science is showing that mechanism is true. 
 [M3]  So, science is showing that we do not have free will. 
 As with determinism, it is not clear that these sciences are  discovering that mechanism 
is true [M2] rather than  assuming it as a useful heuristic. One might, however, argue 
that these sciences provide inductive support for mechanism to the extent that they 
offer evidence that human decision - making and behavior can be explained and pre-
dicted in terms of  underlying mechanisms. But in this case none of  the  specifi c results 
discussed as challenges to free will (for instance, those considered below) is particularly 
relevant to this argument. 
 Premise [M1] is more controversial. It may be motivated by the assumption that free 
will, by defi nition, involves non - natural powers. Consider the way neuroscientist Read 
Montague puts it:
 Free will is the idea that we make choices and have thoughts independent of  anything 
remotely resembling a physical process. Free will is the close cousin to the idea of  the soul 
 – the concept that  ‘ you, ’ your thoughts and feelings, derive from an entity that is separate 
and distinct from the physical mechanisms that make up your body [ … ] Consequently, the 
idea of  free will is not even in principle within reach of  scientifi c description.  (Montague 
 2008 : 584) 
 Psychologist Daniel Wegner assumes that we are dualists about free will:  “ Seeing one ’ s 
own causal infl uence as supernatural is part of  being human ” ( 2008 : 228). And Greene 
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and Cohen write:  “ intuitive free will [ … ] requires the rejection of  determinism and an 
implicit commitment to some kind of  magical mental causation ” ( 2004 : 178). But it is 
entirely unclear whether most ordinary people assume that free will requires non -
 natural powers, and even less clear that they associate it  primarily with such powers 
rather than with the sorts of  powers compatibilists emphasize, such as self - control and 
rational deliberation. Philosophers certainly aim to analyze free will in ways that are 
consistent with our best scientifi c picture of  decision - making; no serious contemporary 
accounts of  free will appeal to substance dualism. 
 In order to examine whether specifi c scientifi c evidence about human decision -
 making challenges free will, we should begin with the assumption that a naturalistic 
account of  free will is possible. On that assumption, some discoveries may help to  explain 
free will rather than explaining it  away . Nonetheless, recent evidence from psychology 
and neuroscience could challenge free will on the basis of  an argument like this: 
 [E1]  Free will requires that one ’ s actions properly derive from one ’ s conscious 
reasoning, decisions, and intentions. 
 [E2]  Science is showing that our actions do  not properly derive from our conscious 
reasoning, decisions, and intentions. 
 [E3]  So, science is showing that we do not have free will. 
 Free will, as understood in [E1], is consistent with determinism. Whether it is consistent 
with mechanism or not is an issue which leads to metaphysical debates about mental 
causation and  ‘ philosophical epiphenomenalism. ’ Some philosophers think that con-
scious mental states cannot play a causal role in action if  they  supervene on neural states 
 – that is, if  changes in mental states depend on changes in neural states (Kim  1998 ). 
But the scientifi c evidence is not relevant to these debates, since the debates  begin with 
the assumption that our mental states supervene on our neural states. For the scientifi c 
evidence to be relevant to this argument, we need to consider whether it adds support 
to [E2] on the naturalistic assumption that all mental processes supervene on  ‘ neural 
correlates. ’ This question then turns on whether there is evidence for a thesis which I 
call  ‘ modular epiphenomenalism ’ (Nahmias  2002 ). This is the thesis that the neural 
correlates of  our conscious experience of  deciding or intending an action (the  ‘ C 
module ’ ) are  not causally responsible for producing that action; instead, distinct, non -
 conscious processes or modules (the  ‘ NC modules ’ ) cause the action, while NC modules 
 also cause the activity in the C modules (see Figure  44.1 ). Hence  ‘ conscious will ’ is an 
illusion (Wegner  2002 ) in that the processes underlying our conscious choices and 
intentions do  not in fact cause our actions  – they are epiphenomenal. 
 Modular epiphenomenalism fi nally offers an empirical thesis that appears to chal-
lenge free will and can be informed by recent scientifi c evidence, rather than relying 
primarily on controversial philosophical claims. So now we are in a position to examine 
some of  this research and then to consider whether it is properly interpreted as a chal-
lenge to free will. 
 Libet ’ s much discussed work represented the fi rst such challenge. Libet  (1985) dem-
onstrated that voluntary muscle movements (fl exing one ’ s wrist) are preceded by 
 “ readiness potentials ” (RPs), brain waves in the supplemental motor area (SMA) which 
occur about half  a second (500  ms) before the movement. Libet also had subjects report 
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when they became aware of  the  “ intention, desire, or urge ” to move, and this 
measure suggested that awareness occurred only 150  ms before the movement  – 
350  ms  after the RP. Libet concluded that voluntary actions  “ begin in the brain 
unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act ” ( 1999 : 51). 
Libet interpreted this result as showing that our conscious intention to move is not 
the cause of  our movement but, like the movement itself, an effect of  earlier (non -
 conscious) brain activity. Libet seems to assume that conscious intentions are non -
 physical; but, if  we reject this dualist assumption, his data look like evidence for 
modular epiphenomenalism: the RP in the SMA is a non - conscious process that causes 
the movement, while the neural correlates of  the conscious experience of  intending 
to move are shown to be epiphenomenal because they occur too late to initiate the 
movement. If  this model of  agency applied to all actions, it would appear to reduce 
the role of  consciousness to one of  merely  observing unconsciously formed decisions 
instead of   making them. 
 Libet ’ s paradigm has recently been extended in an fMRI study. Soon et al.  (2008) 
asked subjects to press a button either with their left or with their right index fi nger 
 “ when they became aware of  the urge to do so ” and to pay attention to when  “ their 
motor decision was consciously made. ” Consistent with Libet ’ s results, subjects gener-
ally reported that they were aware of  their  “ decision ” less than half  a second before 
pressing the button. But analyses of  the fMRI data showed specifi c activity in the fron-
topolar cortex that predicted  which button subjects would press  7 – 10 seconds before the 
movement! And activity in SMA predicted  when subjects would press the button about 
5 seconds before the movement. It should be noted that, while statistically signifi cant, 
these  ‘ predictions ’ (actually post - hoc correlations) could be made with only 60 percent 
accuracy (that is, 10 percent above chance). The authors conclude that
 two specifi c regions in the frontal and parietal cortex of  the human brain had considerable 
information that predicted the outcome of  a motor decision the subject had not yet con-
sciously made.  (Soon et al.  2008 : 545) 
 They take these fi ndings to bolster Libet ’ s case that the  “ subjective experience of  
freedom is no more than an illusion and that our actions are initiated by unconscious 
mental processes long before we become aware of  our intention to act ” (ibid., p. 543). 
Assuming that further studies could drive the predictive accuracy much higher, 















modular epiphenomenalism and premise [E2] look plausible: non - conscious neural 
processes,  not the neural correlates of  conscious decisions, cause actions that we expe-
rience as freely chosen. 
 A third research paradigm suggesting modular epiphenomenalism appears in the 
work of  psychologists such as Wegner and Bargh. As we have seen, these authors 
suggest that simply discovering that there are underlying brain processes for decisions 
and actions is a threat to free will. For instance, Wegner suggests that conscious will 
is an illusion because  “ the real causal sequence underlying human behavior involves 
a massively complicated set of  mechanisms ” ( 2002 : 27). But if  we put aside such 
assumptions and focus on the actual  evidence these psychologists discuss, we can 
consider whether this evidence lends support to modular epiphenomenalism. Though 
Wegner and Bargh discuss neuroscientifi c research such as Libet ’ s, their focus is on 
psychological evidence  – evidence, for instance, of  people performing voluntary - 
looking actions without conscious awareness of  performing those actions or without 
conscious decisions to perform those actions. This evidence is taken to suggest that, 
because non - conscious processes can produce actions normally accompanied by con-
sciousness, consciousness is unnecessary and hence causally irrelevant. Bargh and 
Ferguson conclude:
 the same higher mental processes that have traditionally served as quintessential exam-
ples of  choice and free will  – such as goal pursuit, judgment, and interpersonal behavior 
 – have been shown recently to occur in the absence of  conscious choice or guidance. 
 ( 2000 : 926) 
 Wegner focuses on cases where people lack an experience of  consciously willing a 
bodily movement that they in fact brought about (as in automatisms, or in hypnosis), 
and also on cases where people experience some sense of  agency in relation to a bodily 
movement or an event which they do  not in fact cause (see for example his I - Spy study, 
 2002 : 74). Wegner takes these seemingly exceptional cases to represent the rule that 
our conscious intentions  never cause our actions:
 Rather than conscious will being the rule and automatism the exception, the opposite may 
be true: Automatism is the rule, and the illusion of  conscious will is the exception. (Ibid., 
p. 143) 
 And he suggests modular epiphenomenalism:
 The brain, in turn, shows evidence that the motor structures underlying action [NC 
modules] are distinct from the structures that allow the experience of  will [C module]. The 
experience of  will may be manufactured by the interconnected operation of  multiple brain 
systems, and these do not seem to be the same as the systems that yield action. (Ibid., p. 49) 
 Wegner ’ s explanation for our illusory experiences of  conscious will is that we have 
relevant conscious thoughts just prior to the action, while being unaware of  any com-
peting causes of  the action. But these thoughts are themselves caused by prior non -
 conscious brain activity, such that conscious intention  “ might just be a loose end  – one 
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of  those things, like the action, that is caused by prior brain and mental events ” (ibid., 
p. 55; see Figure  44.1 ). 
 Now that we have seen the sort of  evidence from neuroscience and psychology that 
has been taken to challenge free will, I will fi rst argue that such evidence does not 
clearly demonstrate modular epiphenomenalism  – that is, premise [E2]  – and then 
argue that, even to the extent that it could, this would not pose much of  a threat to free 
will, once we parse premise [E1] more carefully (for more detailed responses to Wegner 
and Libet, see Nahmias  2002 and Mele  2009 ). 
 Wegner and Bargh face a dilemma: they must either take the evidence they describe 
to suggest that the causal role of  consciousness is limited in scope (and further work 
will delimit this scope), or use it as inductive evidence for the general rule that conscious 
processes are never causal. Bargh and Ferguson admit that the evidence they discuss 
shows only that conscious processes play a less signifi cant role that we tend to assume: 
 “ This research has found much of  an individual ’ s complex psychological and behavio-
ral functioning to occur without conscious choice or guidance  – that is, automatically ” 
( 2000 : 941). Plugging this claim into the argument for epiphenomenalism would only 
generate the conclusion that we have  less free will than we tend to think rather than 
none at all. Though I think the scope of  this threat is more limited than the authors 
suppose (see below), not even Bargh ’ s claim of   “ mainly unconscious instead of  con-
scious causation of  action ” ( 2008 : 148) entails the skeptical conclusion that free will 
is an illusion. 
 Wegner tends to take the other horn of  the dilemma and to draw more general 
conclusions about epiphenomenalism. However, to demonstrate that the neural cor-
relates of  conscious intentions are causally cut off  from the neural processes which 
produce actions would require data from the neurosciences, and here Wegner has 
little to offer beyond Libet ’ s work. The unusual cases from the psychological literature 
(voluntary - looking movements without the agent ’ s experiencing control, and small 
increases in reported experiences of  control over events which the agent did not actu-
ally cause) demonstrate only that the experience of  will is not  always veridical, not 
that it is  never veridical. Without the neuro - anatomical data to demonstrate that 
the relevant brain processes are causally unconnected, the best interpretation for 
these  “ illusions of  will ” should be guided by an analogy with visual illusions, which 
certainly do not demonstrate that our visual experiences are systematically mistaken. 
Indeed, as with visual illusions, explanations for illusions of  will may be offered in 
terms of  a generally  reliable system, which sometimes produces inaccurate output 
because of  some unusual feature of  the situation (all the cases discussed by Wegner 
are unusual in important ways). The fact that we  sometimes perform complex behav-
iors without conscious intentions (for example, under hypnosis or with subliminal 
priming) does not show that, on the many occasions when we do perform complex 
behaviors with conscious intentions, the conscious mental processes are causally 
irrelevant. 
 But doesn ’ t the neuroscientifi c evidence presented by Libet and by Soon and col-
leagues give us reason to think that the neural correlates of  conscious intentions and 
decisions are  not causes of  our actions? Not really. Their data are entirely consistent 
with other interpretations. For instance, RPs and the even earlier activity in the fron-
topolar cortex may correlate with non - conscious  urges to move soon (or to push the 
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left or right button), rather than with specifi c  intentions or  decisions . In the experiments, 
this non - conscious activity almost always leads to a consciously experienced intention 
and corresponding action, but in some cases the urge may be  “ vetoed, ” perhaps by the 
subjects ’ conscious intention not to act on that urge (Mele  2009 ). The data is simply 
not suffi cient to show that the non - conscious neural activity  deterministically causes a 
particular action (such that, given that activity, the action must happen). Libet did not 
even analyze data on brain activity in cases where subjects felt the urge to fl ex but did 
not fl ex. And recall that Soon ’ s group could only show that the early brain activity 
predicted the choices at 10 percent above chance, which leaves open the possibility 
that, on some trials, later conscious thoughts, whose neural correlates could not be 
captured in the analyses, infl uenced which button was pressed and when. This inter-
pretation, if  true, allows that the neural correlates of  conscious intentions can causally 
infl uence when, whether, and how a person acts, contra premise [E2]. 
 Another possibility is that the early non - conscious brain activity just  is part of  the 
correlate of  the conscious intention, or part of  the necessary build - up to such intentions 
or decisions. After all, if  we assume that conscious processes correlate with neural proc-
esses, we should expect that conscious experiences do not arise out of  nowhere and in 
no time (Dennett  1991 ). Rather, they will be produced by earlier complexes of  events, 
including external stimuli and neural activity, some of  which may have been caused 
by even earlier  conscious processes. For instance, in these experiments subjects con-
sciously processed and accepted the experimenters ’ instructions, which in the trials 
conducted by Soon and his colleagues were  “ to press either the left or right button with 
the index fi nger of  the corresponding hand immediately when they became aware of  
the urge to do so ” ( 2008 : 15) and  “ to avoid any form of  preplanning for choice of  move-
ment or time of  execution ” (ibid., p. 17; Libet ’ s instructions were similar). If  the subjects 
followed these instructions, they probably formed a distal intention (or plan) to allow 
urges to press a button arise within them, and to pay attention to when the urge arises. 
In the circumstances, it is likely, on the one hand, that this (conscious) distal intention 
or plan causally infl uenced the spontaneous generation of  non - conscious urges to act 
and, on the other hand, that subjects may not be reporting awareness of  a consciously 
formed  intention to act now, but rather awareness of  an urge to act. (This interpretation 
becomes more plausible when we consider that subjects in these experiments must 
repeat tedious button - presses many dozens of  times, so that the action may become 
more habitual and automatic.) 
 Of  course, these alternative interpretations might be mistaken; evidence might 
surface to show that, whenever we consciously intend an action just before we act, our 
being conscious (and the underlying neural processes) simply occurs too late to infl u-
ence the action causally (and the neural correlates of  this proximal intention are not 
 ‘ hooked up ’ to the action – production system). However, even  if this turned out to be 
true  – and again, the evidence has not yet shown it to be true  – I do not think it would 
represent a signifi cant threat to free will. Consider your own experiences of  most vol-
untary actions. If  they are like mine, they rarely involve specifi c conscious intentions 
to move in particular ways just prior to moving. Rather, they are preceded by more 
distal intentions and general plans to carry out various actions, which are followed by 
conscious monitoring of  what we are doing to make sure that the actions correspond 
to these previously formed intentions and plans. 
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 For instance, in these experiments, even  if there are proximal conscious intentions 
to move and they occur too late to affect the action, it would not follow that  all relevant 
conscious mental states were epiphenomenal, since the subjects ’ consciously agreeing 
to move when the urge strikes them surely plays a role in their later actions. Similarly, 
when we drive or play sports or prepare meals, we do not generally form conscious 
intentions to perform each of  the component actions involved in these activities. When 
we lecture to students or converse with friends, we tend not to think about exactly what 
we are going to say right before we say it. Rather we may consciously consider what 
sorts of  things we want to say, and then we  ‘ let ourselves go, ’ though we consciously 
monitor what ’ s happening and consider how to proceed, for instance, in response to 
what our students or friends say. Whereas I take these actions that accord with earlier 
conscious deliberations to be paradigmatic examples of  freely willed actions, Bargh 
suggests just the opposite when he says:
 Our ability to take a vague thought and have it come out of  our mouths in a complete 
coherent sentence, the production of  which happens unconsciously, is  …  not something 
we need consciousness or free will for .  ( 2008 : 145) 
 On many theories of  free will, what is essential is not that conscious intentions formed 
 just prior to action cause one ’ s actions, but that conscious deliberations can have a 
proper downstream effect on the way one acts in the relevant situations, such that we 
act in accord with reasons that we have consciously considered and accepted at some 
point. There is simply no evidence (yet) to show that conscious deliberation, reasoning, 
and planning have no such effects on what we do, or that our conscious monitoring of  
our behavior is not critically involved in the way we carry out and adjust our actions. 
Indeed there is evidence to the contrary  – situations which indicate the crucial roles 
that conscious intention formation, rational thinking, and  ‘ willpower ’ play in some of  
our actions (Gollwitzer  1999 ; Baumeister  2008 ). 
 Of  course, empirical evidence from neuroscience and psychology could show that 
 these  ‘ downstream ’ roles of  conscious mental processes are less signifi cant than we tend 
to think. Indeed some research on moral reasoning seems to suggest that, when people 
make moral judgments, they often act on immediate gut reactions and then their con-
scious deliberations merely come up with  post hoc rationalizations of  these reactions 
(Haidt  2001 ; Greene  2007 ). Furthermore, research in social psychology suggests that 
we are often infl uenced by situational factors of  which we are unaware and whose 
infl uence we would not accept, were we aware of  them. For instance, whether people 
help someone in need depends less on whether the person needs help or on whether 
one considers oneself  a helpful person than on factors such as the number of  bystand-
ers, the ambient noise, or whether one is in a hurry (Ross and Nisbett  1991 ; Doris 
 2002 ). This view suggests one more scientifi c challenge to free will (Nahmias  2007a ): 
 [R1]  Free will requires that one ’ s actions properly derive from decisions or inten-
tions that one has at some point consciously considered, or at least that one 
 would accept, as one ’ s reasons for acting. 
 [R2]  Science is showing that our actions do not properly derive from decisions or 
intentions that we have consciously considered or would accept as our 
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reasons for acting. Rather, our actions are produced by other factors, and we 
 rationalize them after the fact. 
 [R3]  So, science is showing that we do not have free will. 
 I fi nd [R1] plausible, and I think that most philosophical theories of  free will accept 
something like it. Though the existing neuroscientifi c research does not say much 
about premise [R2], research in psychology offers evidence of  numerous cases where 
we don ’ t know why we do what we do and make up reasons for why we did what we 
did. This research has not, however, established that conscious reasoning is always  post 
hoc and ineffi cacious, and I suspect it will not establish such a sweeping conclusion. On 
the other hand, it may show that we have  less free will than we tend to think we have 
 – that our capacities for conscious reasoning and control are less effi cacious than we 
generally assume. Hence scientifi c research may challenge the  degree to which we have 
free will  – and perhaps, in turn, the degree to which we are morally responsible for our 
actions. 
 We now have a better sense of  various ways to interpret recent scientifi c challenges 
to free will. If  such challenges begin with the assumption that free will is incompatible 
with determinism or with mechanism, then they must rely on controversial philosophi-
cal arguments, and it is unclear how specifi c research in psychology and neuroscience 
will advance these arguments. Such research, however, could show that conscious 
processes (and their neural correlates) are  not the proximal cause of  action. Such 
 ‘ modular epiphenomenalism, ’ however, has not yet been established by the relevant 
research in neuroscience and psychology, and the challenge it poses to free will might 
be minimal as long as conscious deliberation and planning have the proper  ‘ down-
stream ’ infl uence on actions. Indeed, the scientifi c discoveries which seem to pose the 
most signifi cant challenge to free will are those which suggest that our conscious delib-
erations and reasoning do  not contribute to our later actions, but only to our  post hoc 
rationalizations of  such actions. As I am someone who thinks that free will, properly 
understood, is compatible with determinism, with mechanism, and even with modular 
epiphenomenalism, it is this evidence for systematic rationalization that I fi nd most 
threatening. Luckily, I think that future research will show this challenge to be limited 
in scope. But I may just be rationalizing. 
 When science claims to have discovered that humans have no free will  – and head-
lines read  “ Case closed for free will? ” (Youngsteadt  2008 )  – people will interpret such 
claims in terms of  their own conceptions of  free will. The danger is that most people do 
not take free will to involve (only) magical powers of  non - physical souls but to involve 
more mundane psychological capacities  – those that allow us to control our own 
behavior, change our habits, overcome addictions, exercise willpower, and consciously 
consider the sort of  life we want to lead. If  people regard free will as including these 
sorts of  capacities, then telling them that they don ’ t have free will could have detrimen-
tal effects on their self - conception, interpersonal relations, and moral behavior, as well 
as on our political debates and legal practices. It could make them more fatalistic, less 
likely to exert what powers of  rational deliberation and willpower they do have, and 
less motivated to act morally (Baumeister et al.  2009 ). Hence it is crucial both that we 
understand people ’ s conception of  free will and that we examine critically what scien-
tifi c discoveries actually tell us about free will. 1 
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 See also :  volition and the will (13);  reasons and causes (17);  action explanation 
and the unconscious (22);  mental causation and epiphenomenalism (23);  the 
explanatory role of consciousness (24);  free will and determinism (38);  responsi-
bility and autonomy (39);  intentional action in folk psychology (45). 
 Note 
 1  I am grateful for helpful comments from Al Mele, Manuel Vargas, Andrea Scarantino, George 
Graham, and the audience at the 2009 meeting of  the APA Central. This chapter was com-
pleted in part with support from a grant from the University of  Chicago Arete Initiative and 
the John Templeton Foundation. 
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